Erdogan’s dominance, negative for Greece

By | May 16, 2023

His probable domain erdoğan This is undoubtedly a negative development for Greece, despite what many analysts and journalists claim to the contrary. And this is because Erdogan represents neo-ottoman version of Turkish expansionism, as opposed to kilicdaroglu and its alliance, who represent it paleochemical version of it.

Erdogan wants a Turkey not only as a great regional power, but as the leader of an Islam of 1.5 or 2 billion, a Turkey isolated from the West, in a global geopolitical game of claims. global of strength.

By contrast, his opponent, with his campaign bickering against Russia and professed pursuit of rapprochement with the West and Europe, represents classic Western-leaning Kemalist nationalism and, at best, sees Turkey simply as a powerful regional power.

Therefore, the reassertion of the primacy of the Turkish strongman who openly threatens Greece with war and wants to treat Americans as equals while considering Europeans as subservient, constitutes a defeat for democracy, the West and Greece.

And yet, during the pre-election period in Turkey, the opinion circulated, often in Russophile writings, that the election of Erdogan “is in our interest”, because he will continue to disagree with the West. They even imply that the latter, the West, will necessarily turn to Greece relatively soon. Thus, they underestimate both the geopolitical realities and the nature of the political confrontation in Turkey.

As for the geopolitical realities, we must be aware that while Erdogan leans towards Eurasianism and “finds it” easier with Putin, Xi Jinping and the Iranians, he is by no means going to abandon the West, at least immediately, with the one that continues maintain important economic, political and defense relations. His logic is to play. between in the great powers and camps as a quasi-equal caliph of Islam.

Erdogan is aware of Türkiye’s geopolitical position and is not going to directly some move to break with one camp or the other unless their vital interests are at stake.

Will continue to take Russia –nuclear factories, condominiums in Syria and Libya, capital, cheap energy, tourist currency– and from the West –investments, imports and exports, participation in the modernization of NATO aircraft, spare parts for its defense industry, etc.

At the same time, it will try to dominate the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean by subjugating Greece and Cyprus and developing relations with the Gulf countries, as a semi-autonomous pole between the camps.

In this sense, the appeasement tendencies of Turkey within the framework of NATO, the European Union and the West as a whole – in the State Department in particular – will continue to be strong, and directly perhaps stronger than under Kilicdaroglu, since he considers Erdogan more unpredictable.

In terms of internal dynamics, Erdogan has had the upper hand as much of Turkish society has embraced the ideology of expansionist Islam. Characteristically, in the National Assembly elections, two parties originating from the gray wolves, Bakhceli and Aksener gathered (cumulatively) about 20% of the vote, while the Islamist extremist Ogan also obtained more than 5% in the presidential elections.

Erdogan is ahead in the elections because he offers the Turks a grandiose neo-Ottoman vision in the face of Kilicdaroglu’s offer of…onion.

Kemal Kilicdaroglu represents a motley alliance of Kurdish, westernized layers of Istanbul youth and Izmir Alevis and nationalists, moderate Islamists ala Davutoglu and traditional Babacan and Kemal.

The possible dominance of such a disparate alliance, especially in the face of a powerful Islamic State apparatus, would constitute the ultimate recipe for the exacerbation of internal contradictions and the emergence of identities such as Alevi, Kurdish and Western-oriented youth who are repressed. by biker Erdogan.

We have often emphasized how a democratic Turkey, with which we could at least argue, presupposes the confirmation of these different identities and obviously the election of Kilicdaroglu would favor such a perspective. Of course, it is not that Turkey would stop being aggressive towards Greece, but that the conflicting forces of the new power would allow these repressed identities of Turkey to express themselves to one degree or another.

Even more so, given that conflict with the powerful Islamic AKP establishment would create quasi-civilian and multi-divisional conditions. On the contrary, the confirmation of Erdoğan’s expansive Islamism – not coincidentally the day before the elections he chose to pray in conquered Hagia Sophia – does not bode well for Greece, especially in the immediate future.

Obviously, however, no evil is pure good. Some Western governments may continue to feed the illusion of Erdogan’s return to the Western fold, such as the US, or may not want to lose a long-time partner, such as Germany.

So it is possible that immediately after the elections they will seem subservient to Erdogan, especially if he lifts the veto on Sweden’s NATO membership. However, the opposite will be the development in the field of civil society and a large part of the Western elites.

Erdogan and neo-Ottoman Turkey will continue to be etched in the minds of Europeans and Americans as an autocratic and largely pro-Russian form of government. If we add the fact that Erdogan appears as a protector of Islam, within European countries, he is in danger of losing Western societies entirely.

If the Greek state and Greek society pursue a policy of constant resistance to the challenges that will inevitably return, and highlight Greece in the consciousness of the Western peoples as the uncritical border of Europe Faced with the totalitarian flood, it would be possible to reverse the game: force Erdogan to deepen his break with the West and thus effectively nullify the policy of cunning expansionist neutrality.

The President of the Government’s speech before Congress, the actions of Omogenia and Menéndez have been our effective weapon against the diplomacy of the foreign ministers.

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